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Scholars disagree whether negative advertising demobilizes or stimulates the electorate. We use an
experiment with over 10,200 eligible voters to evaluate the two leading hypotheses of negative polit-
ical advertising. We extend the analysis to examine whether advertising differentially impacts the
turnout of voter subpopulations depending on the advertisement’s message. In the short term, we ﬁnd
no evidence that exposure to negative advertisements decreases turnout and little that suggests it
increases turnout. Any effect appears to depend upon the message of the advertisement and the char-
acteristics of the viewer. In the long term, we ﬁnd little evidence that the information contained in
the treatment groups’ advertisements is sufﬁcient to systematically alter turnout.
Political pollsters, media consultants, members of the press, and scholars hold
various opinions on whether “negative” advertising is destabilizing democracy in
America. The idea that negative campaigns decrease voter turnout and increase
voter apathy was advanced by academics and warmly received by the news media.
While perhaps intuitive and certainly eye-catching, this idea has recently come
under attack.
In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, scholars focused their attention on
showing how campaigns matter. This work represents a direct attack on the
minimal effects hypothesis associated with the Columbia and Michigan schools
of voting (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and
McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell 2000). Of particular interest is
the question of whether political advertisements—especially negative advertise-
ments—demobilize or stimulate voters.
Interest in the relationship between campaigns and voting has persisted for over
ﬁfty years, but only recently have researchers argued that political advertising has
contributed heavily to the disappearance of voters. Although scholars have used
many methods to test if negative advertisements increase or decrease turnout,
much remains unsettled.
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several ways. First, we employ a large scale, controlled, randomized experiment
to evaluate the two leading theories of advertising effects. In doing so, our work
provides a valuable, but to date absent, experimentally based examination of both
the demobilization and stimulation hypotheses. This is important since the only
previous large-scale experimental study is the highly inﬂuential and controver-
sial Going Negative study of Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995)—a study that
shows that negative advertising is causally related to lower levels of voter turnout.
Second, we design our experiments to test for both the immediate effects of polit-
ical advertising as well as for possible lasting effects. Ours is the ﬁrst experi-
mentally based study to test for long-term effects. This move is important since
researchers are ultimately concerned with whether advertising has an effect that
persists beyond the laboratory.
A third contribution is more theoretical in nature. Relying upon interviews with
political consultants, we offer a third theoretical possibility: the “differential
effects” hypothesis. While it is too strong to suggest that the differential effects
hypothesis represents a new theory of political advertising, its articulation and
examination is valuable because it has implications that differ sufﬁciently from
existing frameworks. Fourth, our experimental design includes several features
that attempt to improve external validity.
The article proceeds as follows. Section one outlines the theoretical questions
and issues we address using both existing literature and interviews with the cam-
paign consultants of Bush and Gore. In addition to sketching brieﬂy the demo-
bilization and stimulation hypotheses, we also explain the differential effects
hypothesis. Section two describes the experimental research design we use to
examine how political advertisements affect turnout. Section three investigates
the immediate impact of political advertising on viewers’self-reported likelihood
of voting and evaluates the evidence in favor of each of the three hypotheses.
Section four uses the panel design we employ to analyze the persistence of treat-
ment effects on turnout, and section ﬁve concludes.
Theory and Hypotheses
Two theories dominate political advertising research—the demobilization and
stimulation hypotheses. The names are appropriate as each indicates the expected
impact of negative advertising on voter turnout. The primary claims of the demo-
bilization and the stimulation hypotheses address the inﬂuence of an advertise-
ment’s tone and not its message. To understand the focus on advertising tone,
consider three post-WWII trends. First, voter turnout has continued to decline
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Sigelman et al. 1985). Second, political cam-
paigns have grown in scope, breadth, and cost (Sorauf 1988). Third, campaigns
have become predominantly negative (Jamieson 2001; West 1997).
The demobilization hypothesis argues that a causal relationship exists between
the (negatively correlated) trending variables of voter turnout and campaign neg-
ativity (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Ansolabehere et al. 1994). Speciﬁcally:
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Although Ansolabehere et al. note that campaigns can be “mobilizing or demo-
bilizing events, depending upon the nature of the messages they generate” (1994,
829), they argue that negative advertisements in presidential, congressional, and
gubernatorial races increase voter apathy and thereby decrease turnout. They also
report that exposure to positive advertisements has the opposite effect.
The behavior of political Independents is of particular interest to the demobi-
lization hypothesis given their increasing size in the electorate and their status as
being “up for grabs.” The demobilization hypothesis claims “to the extent that
Independents are responsive to any form of advertising, it is negative advertis-
ing” (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995, 94). Negative advertising is believed to
have a pernicious effect on Independents since attack campaigns “heighten the
partisan ﬂavor of political discourse” and drive “the Independent voter from the
active electorate” by breeding “distrust of the electoral process and pessimism
about the value of an individual’s own voice” (112–13). This claim implies:
H1B (DEMOBILIZATION COROLLARY): Negative advertising decreases 
the turnout of Independents more than those identifying as Democrats or
Republicans.
Empirical support for the demobilization hypothesis is mixed (see Lau et al.
1999). Nonetheless, the demobilization hypothesis has survived despite a large
amount of contradictory evidence primarily because it is supported by the exper-
imental work of Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and their coauthors.
1Ansolabehere et al.’s
(1994) research is the only large-scale, empirical project that relies upon con-
trolled, randomized experiments across time and different types of races. Conse-
quently we believe the claims of the demobilization hypothesis have persisted
because Ansolabehere and Iyengar’s experimental work has not been adequately
replicated.
An alternative theoretical framework is the stimulation hypothesis credited to
Finkel and Geer (1998), although many scholars have built upon and reﬁned the
framework (Freedman and Goldstein 1999; Lau and Pomper 2002; Wattenberg
and Brians 1999). As initially posited by Finkel and Geer, a weak version of the
hypothesis is essentially the null hypothesis of the demobilization hypothesis. A
stronger interpretation is:
H2A (STIMULATION): Exposure to negative advertising may increase
turnout.
The stimulation hypothesis draws upon insights from several literatures and
suggests that negative information is more helpful than positive information in
making political decisions (Hamilton and Zanna 1972; Kanouse and Hanson
1972; Lau 1982, 1985). Lau shows that, all else equal, negative information is
more inﬂuential than positive information because “negative stimuli somehow
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Iyengar, and Simon 1999; Kahn and Kenney 1999).stand out against a generally positive background” and because “people are more
strongly motivated to avoid costs than to approach gains” (Lau 1985, 132). The
logic of the stimulation hypothesis is: (1) negative advertising is equal or more
informative than positive advertising, (2) information increases interest, (3) inter-
ested voters are more likely to vote, leading to (4) an increase in turnout (or at
least not a decrease) in response to exposure to negative advertising. In other
words, negative advertising increases turnout because negative advertisements
result in more informed voters (or at least not less informed voters).
2
Empirical work investigating the stimulation hypothesis also reveals a rela-
tionship between the amount of attention paid by voters to the campaign (media
exposure) and advertising’s effect. Speciﬁcally, “the effects of advertising tone
are statistically insigniﬁcant among all media exposure groups, except the ‘high
media group’” (Finkel and Geer 1998, 587)—presumably because this group
possesses the necessary context with which to process the information.
H2B (STIMULATION COROLLARY): Exposure to negative advertising
increases turnout among individuals who are attentive to the campaign.
A considerable amount of empirical work, the bulk originating from work with
National Election Studies (NES) survey data, supports the stimulation hypothe-
sis (Finkel and Geer 1998; Freedman and Goldstein 1999; Lau and Pomper 2002;
Wattenberg and Brians 1999). Most suggests that negativity slightly increases
turnout in presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial races.
Interviews with seven leading political consultants of the Republican National
Committee (RNC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) as well as
with individuals who worked directly for the Bush and Gore campaigns lead 
us to believe that perhaps neither the demobilization nor stimulation hypotheses
expresses the relationship between political advertising and voter turnout. Con-
sultants who produce and screen test the political advertisements that researchers
study ﬁrmly believe that advertising tone is not the crucial factor in inﬂuencing
turnout or vote choice. Instead, they believe that what matters most to voters 
in determining whether or not they vote are the issues and personalities involved
in the race. Alex Castellanos, a Republican media consultant who worked for 
the RNC in the 2000 election, reﬂects the thinking of most of the campaign 
consultants we interviewed. Claiming that knowing an advertisement’s tone is
insufﬁcient to understand an advertisement’s effect on voter turnout, Castellanos
notes:
Does negative advertising depress turnout? As with most things in life, yes and no. Oakland
Raiders football is hard, smash-mouth football. And sometimes more people watch the game
when it is mean, smash-mouth football. But sometimes mean football means less people will
watch (Castellanos 2001).
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2Although the hypothesis is vague as to when turnout should increase or remain constant in
response to exposure (although presumably it has to do with the information level of the voter [Zaller
1992]), in either case the prediction offers a stark contrast to that of the demobilization hypothesis.Castellanos follows his remark with a discussion/description of the issues impor-
tant to the demographic groups vital to the Republican Party’s electoral success
and how advertisements are used to mobilize and persuade prospective voters.
He emphasizes how issues and values are important to voters and suggests that
although the tone of an advertisement may be important, the advertisement’s
message is more important.
Although issues and values appear to matter most to political consultants inter-
ested in creating effective advertisements, neither the demobilization nor the
stimulation hypotheses fully account for this possibility. Instead, the two frame-
works focus primarily on advertising tone. Of course, it should be noted that some
important work—particularly the work of Kahn and Kenney (1999)—argues that
tone and issue content interact with each other. This point is considered in further
depth below.
The alternative to the demobilization and stimulation hypothesis we suggest
involves the possibility that advertisements attempt to prime voters by activating
(potentially latent) predispositions—some of which, once activated, lead citizens
to increase their likelihood of voting. Since not all issues in a campaign are of
equal interest/consequence to all voters, the impact advertisements have on
turnout is conditional on both the message of the advertisement and the interests
of the audience. For example, the political debate about prescription drug plans
for the elderly is arguably most consequential to the elderly. Therefore, adver-
tisements about prescription drug plans are arguably likely to be highly relevant
to the elderly’s decision of whether and for whom to vote. The “differential
effects” hypothesis suggests:
H3 (DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS): Advertisements affect turnout if the adver-
tisement addresses an issue of potential concern to the voter.
3
The differential effects hypothesis follows the stimulation hypothesis in assum-
ing that the turnout decision of voters depends upon the amount of personally
relevant information they possess. It distinguishes itself from the stimulation
hypothesis in that it locates an advertisement’s inﬂuence on voter participation
primarily in its message or issue content rather than its tone. Although this does
not preclude the possibility that tone and issue content interact, issue content is
the mechanism by which turnout is affected.
4
The idea that issues matter to political campaigns is not a new perspective.
However, empirical support for the claim focuses solely on the effect of issues
on vote choice. In other words, the focus is on who prospective voters choose and
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3Finkel and Geer provide part of the motivation for our differential effects hypothesis when they
write: “And future research should explore more extensively the potentially differential effects of trait
and issue negativity on the electorate, and the potentially differential effects of the press coverage
and campaign advertisements on aggregate and individual level turnout” (1998, 591–92).
4Kahn and Kenney (1999) argue that tone and issue content both matter, but their emphasis is on
creating a more nuanced categorization of negative campaigning. Their analysis is also at the cam-
paign (not advertisement) level.whether voters are “primed” so that certain issues or considerations are made
more salient—not whether prospective voters actually vote or not (e.g., Carsey
2000; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Johnson et al. 1992;
Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Mendelberg 2001; Milburn 1991; Pan and Kosicki
1997). The differential effects hypothesis draws upon the priming literature by
arguing that just as not all prospective voters are equally susceptible to priming
(Zaller 1992), so too is it possible that not all issues affect voters in the same
way.
Since the differential effects hypothesis holds that an advertisement inﬂuences
the participation of a viewer only insofar as it addresses an issue of concern to
the viewer or exposes the viewer to a new issue of interest, it is necessary to iden-
tify the issues of (potential) relevance to voter subpopulations in order to evalu-
ate the validity of the hypothesis. Consequently, we rely heavily on the ideas of
political consultants to identify which issues mattered for distinct demographic
groups in the 2000 presidential election.
Experimental Design and Methodology
Existing support for the demobilization and stimulation hypotheses is ambigu-
ous because the strongest support for each depends upon different methodolo-
gies. Support for the demobilization hypothesis largely stems from the large-scale
(and unreplicated) experimental work of Ansolabehere and his colleagues. By uti-
lizing randomized, controlled experiments, they are arguably able to determine
causation (Gerber and Green 2000). In contrast, support for the stimulation
hypothesis is based upon the results of observational studies. Given the conﬂict-
ing evidence from the different methodologies, it is not entirely clear which
framework best describes how advertisements affect political participation. To
resolve this controversy, we reexamine both hypotheses in an experimental
setting.
Although experimental methods occupy a privileged place in social science
due to their ability to determine causation, they are not without their limitations.
Two criticisms are particularly applicable to experimental work on the effect of
advertisements. First, because of the “one-shot” manner in which advertising
experiments are conducted, they usually have the ability to measure only short-
term effects (Bartels 1993; Finkel and Geer 1998). Consequently, it is unclear
whether the measured effects are real lasting effects or merely short-term reac-
tions to the provided stimuli (treatments). Second, experiments “have their own
considerable limitations, primarily with respect to external validity” (Bartels
1993, 267). In particular, it is unclear the extent to which results performed on a
convenience sample recruited through advertisements in local newspapers, shop-
ping malls, and other public venues generalize to the national population (Smith
1983). It is also ambiguous how results from an experimental condition general-
ize to real-world conditions, as experimental conditions necessarily consider only
a small subset of advertisements in an environment sterile of outside informa-
74 Joshua D. Clinton and John S. Lapinskition. We seek to alleviate some of the limitations in the experimental design we
adopt.
We conduct our experiments using the panel of Knowledge Networks (KN).
KN’s panelists are randomly selected using list-assisted RDD (Random Digit
Dialing) sampling techniques on a quarterly-updated sample frame consisting of
the entire United States telephone population who fall within the Microsoft Web
TV network (87% of the United States population fall within this network). Our
sample respondents are therefore very close to a national RDD sample. KN Pan-
elists are given an interactive television device (a Microsoft WebTV) and a free
Internet connection in exchange for taking surveys. We use randomly selected
eligible voters (i.e., panelists over the age of 18) from the KN panel for the study.
Using the KN panel enables us to improve incrementally upon the experimental
design of previous research in three ways. First, although our surveys are con-
ducted over the Internet, the selection mechanism used by KN to recruit panelists
ensures that our subjects are close to a random probability sample of the United
States adult population.
5 Second, because we use a preexisting panel, recontact
costs are trivial. Consequently, we contact respondents after the election to deter-
mine if they report having voted. This enables us to examine, for the ﬁrst time,
whether advertisements’ effects last beyond the interview containing the experi-
mental exposure and the extent to which reported effects of previous experiments
may be inﬂated due to artiﬁcial stimulation created by experimental conditions.
A third beneﬁt is that panelists took self-administered experimental surveys in
their own homes using an interactive television device that instantly displays
high-quality video content on their television.
The experiment took place in the course of a KN respondent’s weekly survey
(KN respondents are asked to take one survey a week in exchange for free Inter-
net service and a WebTV). Participants in our study were sent an email to their
WebTV account informing them that their next survey was ready to be taken. A
hyperlink (to the KN servers) in the email led to our experimental survey. Indi-
viduals could complete the survey at their own convenience.
6 As all respondents
must take the survey on the WebTV device, the survey was designed knowing
that all participants have an identical survey experience (Dillman 2000). The
survey asked a variety of political and nonpolitical questions (e.g., their interest
in NASCAR); however, our questions were always asked ﬁrst. During the survey,
those participants randomly selected to be in a treatment group were shown a
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5All telephone numbers have an equal probability of selection, and the sampling is done without
replacement. All telephone numbers not in Microsoft’s WebTV network (around 13% at the time the
experiments were ﬁelded (9/2000–11/2000)) were excluded. Selected numbers are called and the head
of household is informed that the household has been selected to join the Knowledge Networks panel.
The household cooperation rate during this time averaged 56%.
6The median response date was 2.7 days for both waves of our study. This means that half of the
respondents who took the survey completed it within 2.7 days of being sent the survey invitation
email. The response rate was 68%, which is the number of people taking (numerator) the survey
divided by the number assigned (denominator).full-screen advertisement and asked a few follow-up questions. The participants
had no knowledge of their participation in an experiment, although they were cer-
tainly aware of the fact that they were taking a survey with some political content.
7
The experimental design we employ has three features. First, we vary the expo-
sure of participants to advertisements. Two of the ﬁve treatment groups are
exposed to only one advertisement. In doing so, we replicate some of the strongest
experimental ﬁndings of Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995). Although the “one
ad” approach isolates an advertisement’s effect, it does not match well with the
realities of a presidential election campaign, since an advertisement revealed to
be effective when shown in isolation may no longer be so when an opponent’s
response is also shown. To measure the effect of advertisements in a more real-
istic environment, three of the treatment groups expose respondents to compet-
ing advertisements.
Second, we use advertisements that were produced and aired by the compet-
ing candidates (or their respective parties) in the 2000 presidential election. Using
real advertisements was a conscious decision: we want to understand the effect
of actual political advertisements on turnout. While the advertisements deal with
several different policy issues, strictly speaking this should not be too important,
given that only an advertisement’s tone matters for the demobilization and stim-
ulation hypotheses. Finally, we administer a post-election survey to every respon-
dent in our study to determine whether they report having voted in the presidential
election. The experimental design is summarized in the appendix.
Treatment groups A (Gore negative and positive), B (Gore positive), and C
(Gore negative) were in the ﬁeld from October 10, 2000 to November 7, 2000.
Due to a technical difﬁculty (known prior to the administration of the surveys),
a (essentially) random subset of 4,614 respondents in Wave I saw no videos. This
group serves as our control group for Wave I.
8 Wave II (consisting of treatment
groups D (Gore negative; Bush positive), E (Gore negative, Bush negative) and
Control Wave II) was in the ﬁeld from October 30, 2000 to November 6, 2000.
The median respondent in Wave I completed her survey on October 12, 2000
(i.e., two days after being sent the survey), and the median respondent in Wave
II completed her survey on November 1, 2000 (i.e., three days after being sent
the survey). Respondents were randomly assigned to treatment groups, with 2,850
respondents assigned to groups A, B, and C, 2,500 assigned to groups D and E,
and 1,500 assigned to group Control II.
By design, the goals of Wave I and Wave II differ. The experimental manipu-
lations of Wave I attempt to quantify the effect of being shown a single adver-
tisement (or a pair of advertisements) from Gore on the likelihood of voting. In
other words, it tries to determine the treatment effect when presented with a single
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7Unlike the experiments of Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995), where the respondents were unaware
of the goal of the interview, our advertisements are embedded within a political survey. It is unknown
both whether this difference introduces any bias or the direction of such a bias.
8To control for the possibility that the group that saw no advertisements systematically differs from
those who did, we employ statistical controls.(Democratic) perspective. Wave II investigates the effect of advertisements when
exposure is not limited to the views of a single candidate. Speciﬁcally, Wave II
investigates the effect of a Bush (R) positive or negative advertisement condi-
tional on having seen a Gore (D) negative advertisement. Thus, Wave II attempts
to mimic the dynamics of a campaign and assess the impact of advertisements
expressing different (partisan) viewpoints. Cost concerns resulted in our focus on
selected ad pairings.
Testing the demobilization and stimulation hypotheses requires classifying the
tone of an advertisement as being predominantly “negative” or “positive.” Some
have argued that a simple negative versus positive categorization is insufﬁcient
and that a more nuanced scheme is needed. Since there is some controversy on
what the “correct” schema is, and since the stimulation and demobilization
hypotheses do not make such distinctions, we create a simple dichotomous coding
scheme informed by the political consultants interviewed as well as our own
content analysis. Since investigating the differential effects hypothesis requires
identifying both the advertisement’s message as well as its target population,
Table 1 describes the content, tone, and subpopulations targeted by each adver-
tisement in our study according to the interviewed consultants.
9
As is to be expected from random assignment, there is no evidence of signif-
icant sampling variability in the Wave I treatment groups. However, relative to
the national population, every Wave I group overrepresents males and underrep-
resents blacks and those without a high-school education. This is not uncommon
in RDD phone survey research and is reﬂective of the KN panel.
10 Although the
demographics of Wave II are closer to the national population than Wave I
(despite the random assignment of respondents), there are some signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in the demographic composition of the Wave II treatment groups (e.g.,
the proportion over the age of 60). Consequently, Wave II analysis controls for
the demographic differences. The appendix presents a breakdown of sample
demographics.
Results of the Pre-Election Experiments
In this section we examine the experimental data to determine the support for
the three hypotheses in terms of the immediate (short-term) effects of advertise-
ments on voter turnout in presidential elections. The dependent variable is self-
reported voter turnout. Although self-reported turnout is clearly an imperfect
measure of actual turnout given the tendency of potential voters to overreport
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9Although researchers have begun to investigate the possibility that voters may perceive adver-
tisements differently than experts in consequential ways (e.g., Freedman and Goldstein 1999; Lawton
and Freedman 2001), our interest is only in whether there are any systematic effects of objectively
classiﬁed advertisements, not the more nuanced question of whether different voters perceive adver-
tisements differently.
10A detailed research note on Lapinski’s web page (http://www.yale.edu/newmedia) describes the




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.voting (see Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee 2000), this is not a concern for us. Respon-
dents in the treatment and control groups of our randomized experiments are
drawn from the same pool of respondents (i.e., KN panelists) and asked the same
questions. Consequently, there is no reason to suspect that the overreport bias dif-
ferentially affects the treatment or control groups—implying that the estimated
treatment effects are unbiased. In other words, since respondents in the control
group are as likely to overreport as those in the treatment groups, we can attrib-
ute any difference (after employing adequate statistical controls) to the effect of
advertisements. Thus, although the estimation of level effects (i.e., actual voter
turnout) is biased due to voter overreporting, estimation of the treatment effects
associated with showing people advertisements is unaffected.
11An important con-
sequence of this limitation is that it is not possible to forecast from our results
the net effect of advertisements on overall actual turnout. However, the results do
allow us to determine if positive and negative advertisements increase or decrease
turnout.
Wave I Results
Respondents in Wave I were asked the following question after being shown
an advertisement(s):
12
“Please rate the chances that you will vote in the presidential election in November. Are you:
Certain to vote, Probably vote, Chances 50/50, Less than 50/50, Probably won’t vote”
A c
2 test for independence of the Wave I turnout question shows that one cannot
reject the (null) hypothesis that the probability of voting is unrelated to the 
treatment.
13
The inability to distinguish statistically between the voting intentions of the
treatment groups indicates that exposure to a single Gore negative advertisement
(Group C), a single Gore positive advertisement (Group B), or exposure to both
a Gore negative and positive advertisement (Group A) does not affect the self-
reported probability of voting. This constitutes evidence against the demobiliza-
tion hypothesis, since respondents exposed to a negative advertisement do not
systematically differ in their likelihood of voting relative to those who were not
exposed. Although a single negative advertisement may seem insufﬁcient to
provoke voter apathy, recall that previous support for the demobilization hypoth-
esis was found in experiments using a single advertisement hidden in a newscast
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11Although one might hope that it is possible to test the claim that any bias that exists affects all
treatment groups equally, this is impossible because it would require the simultaneous recovery of
the unknown treatment effect and the unknown bias associated with the treatment effect.
12Immediately prior to the administration of the survey, we knew that some respondents would not
be able to see the advertisements because of a temporary technical difﬁculty. We were unable to iden-
tify these respondents prior to assignment. This group was intended to serve as a control group along
with a smaller, fully randomized control group. Unfortunately, the smaller control group was never
ﬁelded in Wave I, making it necessary to rely upon multivariate methods to analyze Wave I.
13A test of independence yields a test statistic of c
2(12) = 4.26.(Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). It may also be posited that the lack of a sys-
tematic effect is due to a fault in the advertisement. However, this would imply
that something other than tone inﬂuences an advertisement’s effectiveness.
Interpreting the results in terms of the stimulation hypothesis is more difﬁcult
due to the inherent ambiguity in the predictions made by the hypothesis. In other
words, because the stimulation hypothesis can predict a null ﬁnding (if the adver-
tisement is sufﬁciently uninformative), it is unclear whether the lack of treatment
effects is evidence against the stimulation hypothesis or evidence that the adver-
tisements tested were sufﬁciently uninformative so as to fail to stimulate voters.
To investigate fully the amount of support for the stimulation and differential
effects hypotheses and to test the demobilization hypothesis’corollary (H2B) that
party afﬁliation matters, we examine the effect of the advertisements’ condition-
ing on both respondent characteristics and treatment-group assignment. This
examines the possibility that although there are no unconditional and systematic
effects of exposure, advertisements may affect the voting behavior of speciﬁc
population subgroups. To test for this possibility, we estimate a probit model for
the dichotomous dependent variable of whether the respondent reports that they
are “Certain to vote.” The covariates used, described in the appendix, include
measures of respondents’ personal and political characteristics, as well as their
exposure to the campaign. We attempt to control for exposure to the campaign
by including (the log-transformation of) the amount of money spent by the Demo-
cratic Party campaigning for the presidential election in the respondent’s state,
which was provided by Kirk Brown, pollster for Vice President Al Gore. We also
control for the respondent’s interest in the campaign and the presence of a Senate
or gubernatorial campaign. As others have argued that turnout decreases as the
“cost” of voting rises (Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone 1980), we also control for 
registration ease (the number of days before an election the state requires to 
register).
Table 2 reports the estimation results of three model speciﬁcations. Every
model speciﬁcation improves upon the 73% ﬁt of the naive model (which simply
predicts that every respondent is “Certain to vote”). Speciﬁcations Model 1 and
Model 2 examine the possibility that there is a systematic effect on the likelihood
of voting once respondents’ demographic and political characteristics are con-
trolled.
14 The speciﬁcations differ in that Model 1 list-wise deletes the 14%
missing data in the household income variable and Model 2 uses the multiple
imputation procedure outlined in King et al. (2001).
15 Table 2 reports the model
speciﬁcations and results, with coefﬁcients attaining standard levels of signiﬁ-
cance (i.e., 5% probability of making a two-tailed Type I error listed as (**) and
10% as (*)).
80 Joshua D. Clinton and John S. Lapinski
14In other words, these two speciﬁcations examine the possibility that the null result of the c
2 test
reported above is the result of offsetting compositional differences in the treatment groups.
15Technically, the multivariate normal imputation algorithm of King et al. (2001) cannot sensibly
be used for categorical data. This criticism is muted for our case given that household income is meas-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4The similarity of the results for Models 1 and 2 reveals that multiple imputa-
tion for the missing values makes little substantive difference. Model 2’s results
reveal that there is some systematic effect on respondents’self-reported certainty
of voting when treatment effects are assumed to be constant across individuals
conditional on the included covariates. The coefﬁcients of interest in Model 2 are
those of Group A, Group B, and Group C, as they represent the difference in
propensity of voting relative to the control group (which is the omitted category).
Under the demobilization (stimulation) hypothesis, Group B should be positive
(positive) and Group C should be negative (positive and statistically greater than
that of Group B). The results indicate that exposure to either has a positive effect
on turnout.
16 This result is inconsistent with the demobilization hypothesis.
Although model 2 does reveal that exposure to the advertisements increases the
certainty of voting in Groups B and C, the negative advertisement is not signiﬁ-
cantly more inﬂuential than the positive advertisement. That exposure to both
advertisements (Group A) has no effect is surprising given the individual expo-
sure effects (i.e., Group B and Group C).
Model 3 permits treatment effects to vary by respondent characteristics to
explore the corollaries to the demobilization and stimulation hypotheses and to
test the differential effects hypothesis. The column labeled “Model 3: Main” pro-
vides the main effect coefﬁcients and standard errors while the columns labeled
“Model 3: Gore negative and positive,” “Model 3: Gore positive,” and “Model 3:
Gore negative” provide the results for the interactions of the treatment effects
with the reported variables. In other words, the coefﬁcients in the “Model 3: Gore
negative and positive” column represent the interaction terms of Group A with
the main effects listed in the ﬁrst column. A likelihood ratio test supports the
(joint) inclusion of the reported interactions.
17
The predictions of the demobilization and stimulation hypotheses are identi-
cal to the predictions for Model 2 in terms of the main effects. The fact that only
the coefﬁcient on Group B (Gore positive) is positive at traditional signiﬁcance
levels (although Group A (Gore positive and Gore negative) is positive at a
weaker level) is damaging to both the demobilization and stimulation hypothe-
sis—as the only advertisement that has a nonzero effect on all viewers is a 
positive advertisement once we permit the effect to covary with respondent 
characteristics.
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16This ﬁnding contradicts the c
2 analysis above, indicating that the distribution of respondents with
the measured characteristics across the treatment groups is somewhat unequal. Consequently, once
the respondent characteristics are accounted for, a signiﬁcant difference emerges.
17Additional interactions were not included in the speciﬁcation of Model 3 because they have no
testable implications in terms of the three hypotheses. Note that models including additional inter-
actions do not affect these substantive results. A likelihood ratio test (LRT) between the speciﬁca-
tions of Model 2 and Model 3 reveals that one can reject the null hypothesis that the included
interaction terms are jointly zero with less than a 1% chance of making a Type I error. The test yields
a test statistic of c
2(27) = 53.40.The demobilization corollary H1B predicts that Independents are most sus-
ceptible to negative advertising. If true, the interaction of Group B with Repub-
lican and Democrat should be positive—accounting for the fact that the impact
of the advertisement is estimated relative to the omitted category of political Inde-
pendents. Inspection reveals that party identiﬁers are not more or less likely to
report being “certain to vote” relative to political Independents for any of the
treatment groups. Consequently, there is no support for either the primary or
corollary predictions of the demobilization hypothesis in Wave I.
The stimulation hypothesis’ corollary H2B claims that individuals who are
highly interested in the campaign and primed with negative information (adver-
tisements) are more likely to vote. Examining the interaction of Attention to
Campaign (high) and Group C in the “Model 3: Gore negative” column shows
that the interaction is signiﬁcant and negative—implying that respondents who
pay a great deal of attention to the campaign and who are exposed to a single
negative advertisement are less likely to vote than those high attention respon-
dents in the control group.
Having found faint support for the traditional demobilization and stimulation
hypotheses, we now move to test the predictions of the differential hypothesis.
Testing the hypothesis is inherently more ambiguous due to its conditional nature.
However, since both advertisements deal with the issues of prescription drugs
and HMO reform, we expect the largest impact on older and poorer individuals.
Consequently, we would expect to observe positive interactions between the net
effect of Age and Age
2 and Household Income and the treatment groups (Group
A, Group B, and Group C). Our interviews with the consultants reveal a few
additional testable implications that we empirically evaluate.
In discussing the Gore positive “Bean Counter” advertisement (shown to treat-
ment groups A and B), Kirk Brown, the pollster responsible for Al Gore’s adver-
tising testing in the 2000 campaign, noted that when the advertisement was shown
(8/30/00 to 9/24/00) Gore was in need of a “bump,” and “when we ran ‘Bean
Counter,’ which was after the convention, we had generally gotten a bounce out
of the convention and had improved with women, so we tried to solidify those
gains” (Brown, 2001). Referencing the testing and strategy behind the “Bean
Counter” advertisement, Brown remarked that “‘Bean Counter’ worked better
with women than men, but it still was pretty good with men—especially those
against the interests of big companies.” Assuming the advertisement was effec-
tive, we should expect a positive interaction effect between Female and Group A
and Group B.
In contrast, the consultants noted that the “Siding” advertisement was not very
effective. As a result, it received only limited exposure—being shown for only
ﬁve days (as opposed to the 26 days for the “Bean Counter” advertisement). Con-
sequently, this advertisement may be ineffective in targeting the elderly with its
HMO reform message.
Model 3 provides limited, but not unqualiﬁed, support for the differential
effects hypothesis. In terms of the predictions for the positive “Bean Counter”


















































































































































































































































































.86 Joshua D. Clinton and John S. Lapinski
advertisement in Group B, the results are precisely as expected among women
and the elderly (i.e., the interactions of Group B with the net effect of Age and
Age
2 and Female reported in the “Model 3: Gore positive” column are positive).
Given the difﬁculty in interpreting probit coefﬁcients due to their conditional
nature, Figure 1 depicts the treatment effect of Group B (Gore positive) relative
to the control group for a respondent with average characteristics.
The upper left and right ﬁgures show that women and men in the control group
are equally likely to vote and that the probability of voting increases with age.
The lower left and right ﬁgures report the probability of voting for male and
female respondents in Group B (Gore positive). Two items are of interest. Com-
paring the lower-left and lower-right ﬁgures shows that females exposed to Group
B are more likely to vote than males—precisely as is expected. Comparing the
upper and lower ﬁgures reveals that the elderly (and young) are more likely to
vote after being exposed to the “Bean Counter” advertisement than those in the
control group. This is expected given the importance of the issue to the elderly
(who would beneﬁt) and the young (who would pay).
Support for the differential hypothesis is less promising in treatment groups A
(Gore negative and Gore positive) and C (Gore negative). There is no evidence
that respondents of any description in Group C are any more or less likely to
report being “certain to vote” relative to the control group despite being exposed
to a negative advertisement dealing with HMO reform. Although it may be that
the “no effect” is because the “Siding” advertisement is as ineffective (as the con-
sultants suggest), such an interpretation cannot explain the results of Group A.
Assuming that the “Siding” advertisement is ineffective, we would expect the
treatment effects for Group A to be identical to those for Group B. However, the
interaction effects for treatment Group A and Female, Age and Age
2 are not dif-
ferent from zero.
The results of Wave I are clearly not favorable to the predictions of either the
demobilization or stimulation hypotheses, as very little support is found for either
the primary or corollary predictions. The predictions of the differential hypothe-
sis fare somewhat better, although the support is not unambiguous.
Wave II Results
The second set of experiments differs from those of Wave I in three respects.
First, Wave II aims to determine the effect of an advertisement conditional on
previous exposure to a competitor’s advertisement. Second, Wave II exposes
respondents to advertisements only a week before Election Day. Third, the ques-
tion used to assess the probability of voting differs from Wave I. Wave II respon-
dents were asked:
“Using a ten-point scale, please indicate how likely you are to vote in this year’s elections for
president and Congress. If you are certain that you will vote, pick a number closer to “8,” “9,”
or “10.” If it is less likely that you will vote, use a number closer to “1,” “2,” or “3.” You may
choose any number between one and ten.”Although subjects were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, 
ex post differences in the treatment groups’ demographic composition indicate
the need to control for demographic characteristics. Consequently, we proceed
directly to the ordinary least-squares regression of the three speciﬁcations given
in Table 3. Recall that Group D consists of a negative Gore and a positive Bush
advertisement, and Group E involves exposure to both a negative Gore and a neg-
ative Bush advertisement. Since Group E contains two negative advertisements,
it represents our strongest test of the demobilization and stimulation hypotheses
and their corollaries. The demobilization hypothesis predicts a negative coefﬁ-
cient for Group E, and the stimulation hypothesis predicts that the coefﬁcient for
Group E is positive and greater than Group D (which may also be positive).
As in the Wave I experiments, the results for Wave II reveals some evidence
of systematic and positive treatment effects. Model 4—which handles the 14%
nonresponse of household income using list-wise deletion—does not ﬁnd either
the treatment effects Group D or Group E to be statistically signiﬁcant. Although
Model 5, containing the multiple imputations for household income, indicates
positive treatment effects for Group E, the magnitude of the effect is unimpres-
sive—amounting to an increase of .2 in the likelihood of voting on a 10-point
scale (and only 5% of the effect that being registered to vote has). Consequently,
the ﬁndings of Model 4 and 5 are contrary to the predictions of the demobiliza-
tion hypothesis and not particularly encouraging for the stimulation hypothesis.
18
Model 6 permits the effect of advertisements to vary with respondent charac-
teristics.
19 As in Wave I, there is no evidence that the interactions of Group D
and Group E with Democrat and Republican are positive. Contrary to the corol-
lary prediction of the demobilization hypothesis (H1B), there is no support that
political independents are less likely to vote relative to party identiﬁers after being
exposed to two negative advertisements. Support for the stimulation hypothesis’
corollary is also elusive, as respondents who pay a great deal of attention to the
campaign are actually less likely to vote after being exposed to the two negative
advertisements of Group E.
Support for the differential effects hypothesis can be examined by determin-
ing whether the advertisements differentially affect the probability of voting
among the targeted groups. As both advertisements in Group E (Gore’s negative
“Trickle Down” and Bush’s negative “Gore-gantuan”) deal with tax cuts and gov-
ernment spending, we expect a positive interaction between Group E and House-
hold Income. The interaction of Group E and the net effect of Age and Age
2
should also be positive—reﬂecting the concern of the elderly with government
spending (on the elderly).
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18Strictly speaking, a null ﬁnding cannot reject the stimulation hypothesis, as it might be the case
that the advertisements are uninformative. However, so long as the theory is falsiﬁable, exposure to
two negative advertisements represents our strongest case under which we might expect to observe
an increase in turnout.
19A LRT for the null hypothesis that the interactions are jointly zero is rejected with a test statis-
tic of c
2(18) = 31.44.88 Joshua D. Clinton and John S. Lapinski
TABLE 3
Wave II OLS Turnout Model
Model 6: Model 6:
Model Model 6: Group D Group E
5 Main Interactions Interactions
Model (Income (Income (Gore negative, (Gore negative,
Variable 4 Imputed) Imputed) Bush positive) Bush negative)
Constant 4.17** 4.12** 3.70**
(Std. Err.) (.427) (.393) (.496)
Group D .130 s.145 1.37
[Gore negative, (.106) (.099) (.890)
Bush positive]
Group E .132 .203** .959
[Gore negative, (.109) (.102) (.893)
Bush negative]
Log of Democratic .005 .002 .003
Spending (.006) (.005) (.005)
Registration  -.006 -.012** -.012**
Rules (.006) (.005) (.005)
Senate Race -.040 -.050 -.038
(.108) (.101) (.101)
Gubernatorial .179 .159 .145
Race (.130) (.121) (.122)
Registered to 3.82** 3.75** 3.78**
Vote (.12) (.107) (.107)
Black -.066 -.002 .001
(.156) (.146) (.146)
Education .073* .071* .051 -.131 .243**
(.044) (.041) (.055) (.100) (.102)
Attention to -2.66** -2.71** -2.55** -.567* -.117
Campaign (.136) (.125) (.163) (.307) (.309)
(low)
Attention to 1.04** 1.05** 1.21** -.254 -.494**
Campaign (.103) (.097) (.129) (.239) (.243)
(high)
Age -.023 -.017 .005 -.044 -.072**
(.015) (.013) (.018) (.035) (.035)
Age
2 .0003* .0002* .000006 .0004 .0007**
(.0001) (.0001) (.0017) (.0003) (.0003)
Female .017 .054 .055 .080 -.117
(.085) (.080) (.107) (.199) (.204)
Democrat .332** .351** .476** -.430** -.102
(.118) (.108) (.145) (.263) (.274)
Republican .457** .522** .655** -.602** .017
(.125) (.115) (.152) (.284) (.292)
HH Income .053** .055** .030* .062** .055*
(.013) (.012) (.017) (.032) (.032)
N 2711 3137 3137
Adj. R
2 .60 .60 .60Deriving the expectations with respect to Group D (Bush positive “Phyllis
Hunter” and Gore negative “Trickle-Down”) is less straightforward given the dif-
ferent issues the advertisements target. Table 1 reveals that consultants designed
the advertisements in Group D to target women (with education in the “Phyllis
Hunter” advertisement) and low-income men (with economic issues in “Trickle
Down”). Consequently, it is not clear what the marginal effect of being female
should be relative to the control group given that one advertisement targets each
group. However, the focus on tax cuts can be predicted to increase the probabil-
ity of voting conditional on income (i.e., the interaction of Group D and House-
hold Income should be positive).
Model 6 reveals some support for the predictions of the differential hypothe-
sis. The interaction terms of Group D and Group E with Household Income are
positive (although only at 10% probability of making a Type I error for Group
E). The net effect of income on the likelihood of voting for those in either treat-
ment groups is roughly three times the effect relative to those in the control group.
Contrary to predictions the net effect of the interaction of Group E on Age and
Age
2 is negative for all respondents—indicating that the elderly reported a lower
probability of voting after being exposed to negative advertisements against tax
cuts and government (over)spending. Although the treatment effect also varies
with respect to education in Group E, this ﬁnding is unanticipated.
In summary, the ﬁndings from the Wave I and Wave II experiments provide 
no evidence for either the primary or the corollary predictions of the demobi-
lization hypothesis. There is no evidence that negative advertisements systemat-
ically decrease the reported likelihood of voting. Although support for 
the stimulation hypothesis is evident in the speciﬁcations of Model 2 and Model
5, permitting the effect of advertisements to depend on respondent characteris-
tics reveals little evidence that negative advertising increases the turnout of
viewers. Only the predictions of the differential hypothesis remain unrejected,
although the support is ambiguous given that only some of the anticipated effects
are realized.
The Lasting Effects of Advertising: Results from the 
Post-Election Survey
A unique component of our research design is that we reinterview respondents
after the election to determine whether or not they report having voted. This
departure from a traditional single-interaction design allows us to examine
whether advertisements have a lasting effect. While measuring for persistence is
signiﬁcant, it is important to note a priori that it is unlikely that an effect will be
found. Relative to the amount of information respondents are exposed to after
taking the survey and prior to the election, the amount of information contained
in the treatment advertisements is presumably relatively small (especially for
Wave I respondents). It would therefore be surprising to ﬁnd that exposure to the
information contained in the treatment groups is decisive in the respondent’s deci-
“Targeted” Advertising and Voter Turnout 89sion of whether or not to vote. However, this is an empirical question we are in
a position to answer.
Although 29% of the respondents who participated in Wave I and II failed to
complete our post-election survey, conducting a test of selection effects for a
binary second-stage equation reveals that there is no evidence that this nonre-
sponse is correlated with a respondent’s decision to vote (Dubin and Rivers
1989/1990).
20 Consequently, we condition only on those who complete the post-
election survey.
Overall, 82% of the respondents in the post-election study reported voting.
Although this is certainly a biased measure of actual voting behavior, insofar as
the bias affects the treatment groups equally our treatment effects remain unbi-
ased estimates of the advertisement(s) effect. As respondents in Wave I and II
were administered identical post-election surveys, we pool their responses for
efﬁciency reasons. Table 4 reports the estimates of analysis of the post-election
survey using the dichotomous dependent variable of whether or not the respon-
dents reported voting in the 2000 presidential election using list-wise deletion
(Model 7) and multiple imputation (Model 8).
The results of Table 4 are not encouraging for any of the three hypotheses. The
cleanest predictions from the demobilization (stimulation) hypothesis are that the
treatment effects associated with negative advertisements (i.e., Group C and
Group E) should be negative (positive). Model 8 reveals that only the treatment
effect associated with Group D is nonzero. Although the lack of main effects is
entirely consistent with the differential effects hypothesis, there is no evidence
that the effect of exposure depends upon viewer characteristics. Contrary to the
predictions of the differential effects hypothesis, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the demographic and campaign interest interactions in previous speciﬁca-
tions are jointly zero (c
2(51) = 42.99). Necessarily, this also implies that there is
also no evidence for the corollary predictions of the demobilization (H1B) and
stimulation (H2B) hypotheses.
While we believe that our panel experimental design is very important, it is
important to place the null results in the proper context. The fact that exposure
to the treatment groups does not inﬂuence the likelihood of respondents voting
in systematic (and predictable) ways does not imply that advertisements do not
inﬂuence whether or not respondents vote. Instead, it demonstrates that exposure
to the one (or two) advertisements used in the treatment groups does not sys-
tematically affect whether respondents decide to vote conditional on all other
information about the race (or process) they possess. Although we attempt to
control for exposure to campaign information, it is certainly possible—if not
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20The selection equation consists of the full set of interactions and the following instruments: an
indicator of whether the respondent is the household member who initially agreed to participate in
the KN panel, the number of days elapsed between the assignment of the respondent’s ﬁrst survey
(KN proﬁle survey), and the entry into our pre-election survey and whether or not the respondent 
is married. Despite the presence of 73 covariates, the model ﬁt predicts nonresponse on the post-
election survey little better than the naive model and achieves a pseudo R
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TABLE 4
Post-Election Probit Voting Model
Model 8
Variable Model 7 (Imputed Income)
Constant (Std. Err.) 17.19* 14.17*
(9.13) (8.52)
Group A [Gore negative, Gore positive] .094 .040
(.069) (.063)
Group B [Gore positive] .033 .034
(.063) (.059)
Group C [Gore negative] .056 .079
(.067) (.063)
Group D [Gore negative, Bush positive] .138** .122**
(.064) (.060)
Group E [Gore negative, Bush negative] .046 .032
(.064) (.060)
Log of Democratic Spending .0002 -.0007 
(.002) (.002)
Registration Rules -.001 -.002
(.002) (.002)
Senate Race .003 .003
(.044) (.04)
Gubernatorial Race .022 .054
(.053) (.051)






Attention to Campaign (low) -.413** -.407**
(.054) (.050)













HH Income .007 .007
(.005) (.005)
N 6170 7072
% Corr Pred. 74% 74%
Pseudo R
2 .12 .13plausible—that exposure to information exterior to the treatment groups is 
more inﬂuential than that of the few advertisements in our treatment groups. 
The positive ﬁnding of our post-election analysis is that it appears necessary to
expose respondents to more than two advertisements in order to create any lasting
effect if we are to determine how respondents weigh various sources of infor-
mation when deciding whether or not to vote. The lack of persistence we docu-
ment might provide a reason as to the increasing frequency of political
advertisements as the election approaches—candidates must continually adver-
tise to remain relevant.
Conclusion
Our study attempts to settle a long-standing empirical controversy and provide
some additional theoretical direction for the future study of advertising effects.
The longitudinal tests we conduct provide the ﬁrst large-scale experimental
follow-up study to Ansolabehere and Iyengar’s seminal work on negative adver-
tising. In so doing, we subject the predictions of both the demobilization and
stimulation hypotheses to tests using a common methodology in the context of
the 2000 presidential election.
We ﬁnd no evidence to support the predictions of the demobilization hypoth-
esis. It is never the case that exposure to negative advertising decreases either the
reported probability of voting or the actual voting. Furthermore, no evidence is
found to support the claim that political Independents are most susceptible to
negative advertisements.
The stimulation hypothesis fares slightly better. Our results indicate that adver-
tisements increase (or at least do not decrease) the propensity of voting in the
short term regardless of tone. However, once treatment effects are permitted to
vary according to respondent characteristics, this ﬁnding vanishes—leaving no
support for the claim that respondents exposed to either a single negative adver-
tisement (Group C) or two negative advertisements (Group E) are more likely to
intend to vote, even for the highly interested.
Relying on interviews with political pollsters and media consultants involved
with the Bush and Gore campaigns of 2000, we also consider a third possibility:
that perhaps tone is less important than the intersection of issues viewers care
about and the message of the advertisement. The differential effects hypothesis
we outline attempts to account for the possibility that advertisements “target”
(and are most effective among) speciﬁc voter subpopulations. Although unsur-
prising to the political consultants, this possibility has not been widely examined
by academics.
Evidence for the differential effects hypothesis is stronger than that for either
the demobilization or stimulation hypotheses. Several treatment groups reveal
effects that depend on voter characteristics precisely as predicted. However,
support is not universal, as some predictions are not borne out.
92 Joshua D. Clinton and John S. LapinskiOur results suggest several avenues for future research. First, there appears to
be very little reason to continue to investigate the demobilization hypothesis in
the context of presidential elections. Second, additional research into the role that
information plays in determining whether a potential voter participates (and the
impact on vote choice) is needed. In particular, how do voters weigh information
contained in advertisements relative to other sources of information about the
candidates? Our post-election survey reveals that other information is clearly rel-
evant to whether or not voters vote and that the impact of exposure does not
persist for very long outside the experimental setting. Only by understanding the
context within which voters receive and analyze the information contained in
political advertisements will it be possible to determine the effectiveness of
advertisements. We hope our work contributes to the pursuit of a better under-
standing of the causal mechanisms underlying how advertising affects the 
electorate.
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Appendix
Experimental Design
Group Sample Size Content Advertisement(s)
A 2223 Gore negative “Siding”
Gore positive “Bean Counter”
B 2236 Gore positive “Bean Counter”
C 2204 Gore negative “Siding”
D 1381 Gore negative “Trickle Down”
Bush positive “Phyllis Hunter”
E 1356 Gore negative “Trickle Down”
Bush negative “Gore-gantuan”
Control II 832 None None
Demographic Characteristics of Sample
Group No HS Educ. Black Female Inc. > 75K Democrat Age > 60
A 6% 7% 45% 23% 41% 17%
B 6% 8% 49% 24% 42% 14%
C 6% 8% 47% 27% 42% 14%
Ad not shown 5% 7% 46% 25% 41% 19%
D 10% 10% 52% 24% 43% 26%
E 8% 9% 55% 23% 42% 16%
Control Wave II 11% 9& 51% 19% 40% 23%94 Joshua D. Clinton and John S. Lapinski
Appendix continued
Measures Used in the Analysis
Measure Description
log(Democratic Spending) Advertising spending by Gore and DNC in state after Democratic
convention in dollars (from Kirk Brown of Hickman and 
Brown)
Registration rules Number of days before the election a state requires voters to 
register in order to vote. Ranges from 0 (same day registration) 
to 31 days.
Registered to Vote 1 (“At current address” or “At a different address”); 0 (Else)
Gubernatorial race 1 (Gubernatorial race in state), 0 (no Gubernatorial race)
Senate race 1 (Senate race in state), 0 (no Senate race)
Black 1 (black respondent); 0 (otherwise)
Education 1 (“Less than High School”) to
5 (“Post graduate degree [Masters, professional, doctorate]”)
Attention to Campaign (orig.) 1 (“None”) to 5 (“A great deal”)
Recoded into: Low (1 or 2) otherwise 0; High (4 or 5) otherwise 0
Attention to Campaign (low) Omitted category = 3
Attention to Campaign (high)
Age Age of respondent (must be over 18 and eligible to vote to be a 
participant)
Age
2 Square of Age
Democrat Indicator variable for identifying as Democrat (1); 0 otherwise
Republican Indicator variable for identifying as Republican (1); 0 otherwise
HH Income HH income in 1999: 1 (“Less than $5K”) to 17 (“More than 
$125K”)
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